

# DISSIPATION OF INDIA'S GEOPOLITICS IN ASIA

Dr. NL DONGRE, IPS, Ph.D., D.Litt. (Doctor of Letters)



President's House of Indian Republic

## Abstract

Geopolitics is defined as the operating system of a government's foreign policy that evaluates places beyond its boundaries. Such systems involve evaluation of places beyond the state's boundaries in terms of its strategic importance and potential threats. It operates at three levels: local, regional and Global. The local level system involves evaluation of neighboring states. The regional level system is required for states that intend to exhibit their powers beyond their neighbors. A few states have Global policies and their governments will have appropriate worldwide Geopolitical system. The changes in India's Geopolitics in Asia from non-aligned approach to one of hegemonic domination, with the world becoming multipolar, the non-aligned Nehruvian legacy became redundant. India has emerged as one of the poles in Asia. Consistent threats and pressures from the smaller and larger neighbors have necessarily compelled India to re-shape her Geopolitics to one of 'restraint' hostility. And this probably made India an acknowledged power, from a regional power to a 'weltmacht'. India has a peculiar Geographical location which sets the strategic assumptions in forming its foreign policy. The Indian foreign policy can be identified as its formative stage, when Jawaharlal Nehru dominated Indian politics giving it a distinctive geopolitical system. At the local level India offered an informal protectorate over the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim without interfering in their internal politics till Sikkim merged with India in 1975. A paternal attitude to Sri Lanka, where it has interfered in the civil war. At the regional level, there was an acute rivalry with Pakistan in South Asia and with China at a larger Asian Continent scale. Globally India desired and pretended to become a World Power. This was cantered when Nehru emerged as a statesman and his role in the establishment of the Non-aligned movement. India's foreign policy was described as one of neutrality, non-alignment, or independence – a policy based on the consideration of each issue on its own merit.

**Keywords:** The Non-Aligned Geopolitics , Panch Shila, 'World Class', Line of actual control (LAC) Ballistic missile, "China killer" "Great power dreams," "Hormuz dilemma." Single hegemonic power, Huge economic potential, Political folds, 'Hostile' 'diplomatic' 'Remaining' territory 'Defense agreement', Uateranill cease-fire ,Pakistan's Kashmir policy 'Confidence building measures,'

Geopolitics asserts- the study of relationship among politics and economics, especially international relations, as influenced by Geographical factors. Geography remains in entwined with Geopolitics. I like to highlight powerful echoes that Markham(1898) and Mackinder(1911) would have recognized an urgent need of political responsibility. In great powers and Geo political change, Jakub Gragiel(2006) suggested that the international relations is dominated by Social scientific perspectives on power and ignores the natural scientific insides. These are the characteristics of the Geopolitics. Geopolitics is defined as the operating mode of a government's foreign policy that evaluates places beyond its boundaries. 'It is a set of strategic assumptions that a government makes about other states in forming its foreign policy (Kaplan,2009,Maddrell,2010). Such operational system(s) involves evaluation of places beyond the state's boundaries in terms of its strategic importance and potential threats. It is not just state-centric; it also involves a particular single state's view of the world. It operates at three levels: local, regional and global. The local-level system involves evaluation of neighbouring states.....The regional-Geopolitics is required for states that aspire to project their power beyond their immediate neighbours. The governments of all regional powers and potential regional powers need to map out such system(s). Finally, a few states will have global policies, and their governments will have appropriate world-wide geopolitics ('Taylor & Flint 2000 / 2004: 91). The geopolitical system gives a highly biased picture of the world on account of its being state-centric that carves out what Henrikson (1980) calls an 'image-plan'. It is the building bloc of the geopolitical world orders.

The present paper is an attempt to analyze India's ever changing strategic assumptions in the light of the following pertinent questions:

- 1 To what extent was India's non-aligned geopolitics a success during its formative stage?
- 2 Does India possess a hostile and aggressive approach toward its neighbours?
- 3 Does India aspire to become a regional power, or a global power?



**Geopolitical Map Of Asia**



**These leaders and their countries did not view the Cold War as an ideological struggle. This was a smokescreen. The Cold War was a power struggle from their perspectives and ideology was merely used as a justification.**

## **THE NON-ALIGNED GEOPOLITICS**

India has a peculiar geographical location on the cross-road of the South Asia and the Central, or high Asia, and this has shaped its 'image-plans' to evaluate places beyond its boundaries, or in other words, it sets the strategic assumptions in forming its foreign policy.

The three spatial levels of approaches in Indian foreign policy can be identified during its formative stage, particularly, when Jawaharlal Nehru dominated Indian politics, and gave it a distinctive geopolitics. At the local level, India offered a sort of informal protectorate over the small Himalayan kingdoms (Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim till Sikkim's merger with India in 1975) and a paternal attitude to Sri Lanka, where it has interfered in the civil war. At the regional level, there was an acute rivalry with Pakistan in South Asia and with China at a larger Asian continental scale. Globally, India had desired, or pretended to become a world power. This was centered on Nehru's status as a world statesman and his role in the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (Taylor & Flint 2000 / 2004).

India's foreign policy was described as one of 'neutrality', 'nonalignment', or 'independence'-a policy based on the consideration of each issue on its own merits.

In the first statement which he made when he became member for external Affairs in the Interim government in September, 1946, Nehru said: 'In the sphere of foreign affairs, India will follow an independent policy, keeping away from power politics of groupings aligned against the other'. Krishna Menon, Nehru's chief advisor on foreign policy, declared in the UN General Assembly, on October 17, 1960: 'We are not neutral country.....We want it understand that we do not welcome this appellation of

being called a neutral, or neutralist, whatever it means.....We are neutral in regard to war or peace. We are not neutral in regard to domination by imperialist or other countries .We are not neutral with regard to ethical values.....Neutrality is a concept that arises only in war.....Therefore, our position is that we are unaligned and uncommitted nation in relation to the Cold War.....we do not belong to one camp or another’.

In his biography of Nehru, Michael Brecher (1959: 563) remarked: ‘The term to describe Indian foreign policy has undergone frequent changes. It has begun with ‘neutrality’, or ‘dynamic neutrality’, later became ‘neutralism’ and then ‘non-alignment’. Nehru prefers the phrase ‘positive policy for peace’.

Nehru placed particular emphasis on ‘non-alignment with the great power groups’, on opposition to colonialism, and on the necessity of peaceful co-existence and of creating a climate of peace. ‘Peace’, he argued, ‘can only be preserved by methods of peace. A war-like approach to peace is a contradiction in terms.....Peace cannot live in an atmosphere of constant preparation for war and threat of war....The major fact is that we are following not a passive or merely neutral policy, but a dynamic policy which is based on certain definite principles and objectives as well as certain methods. We try not to forget the means in search for our ends.....It must be recognized.....that any policy that is realistic must take into consideration the profound changes in the relationships of forces in Asia and the world’.

Initially, Nehru’s foreign policy developed along the idealistic lines, Combining a Gandhian moralist heritage and tradition with a social democratic idealism derived from contacts with British Labour leaders. In order to make the non-aligned geopolitical code successful, Nehru accepted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet through the infamous Sino-Indian Friendship Treaty in April 1954 that endorsed the ‘nebulous’ principles of peace, especially the PanchShila, or Panchsheel (five principles of peace). It was probably the first attempt to make the non-aligned approach relevant to the contemporary ‘East versus West’, world geopolitical order, created on account of the ideological confrontation in a bi-polar world order. The 1954 Treaty, based on morality and ethics, was designed in a way as to resolve the differences over Tibet. Inherent in the Treaty was a ‘cautious’ declaration that the territorial disputes of the nature could be resolved peacefully by adopting the paradigm of the PanchShila with the ultimate aim of generating a world of peaceful co-existence. India, then, launched a ‘moral’ propaganda offensive offering the five principles of peace (PanchShila) as a solution to the world’s geopolitical problems. The non-aligned approach, as a matter of fact, was intended toward collective peace to challenge the emerging Cold War trend of collective security by military alliances. The success of the non-aligned geopolitics was achieved in December 1957 when the United Nations endorsed the incorporation of the PanchShila in its resolution, as a means to resolve the conflictual crisis, arising out of the ‘East versus West’, ideological confrontation between capitalism and socialism.

Parallel with the moral and ethical crusade to resolve the emerging international tension and crisis, India began the task of geopolitical engineering of bringing the ‘developing countries’ within the non-aligned fold so that these countries would not align themselves with either of the collective military alliances, taking shape. in 1947 (Asian Relations Conference) and then in 1949, when fifteen Asian countries met in New Delhi to protest against the colonial policy of the Netherlands in Southeast Asia, particularly, in Indonesia. For time, the non-aligned approach appeared successful at a relatively ‘larger’ regional level. In 1950, India convened the first ad hoc Afro-Asian ‘caucus’ at the United Nations.

At the local level, however, India offered a shadow protection to the Himalayan kingdoms: Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, without interfering in the internal politics of these kingdoms. It was a continuation of the British frontier policy, so at that level, the policy of non-intervention vis-à-vis nonalignment yielded some positive results.





**Indian Delegate Jawaharlal Nehru at the Un General Assembly**

But at the regional level, the non-aligned geopolitical code suffered at the Chinese hands. The Sino-Indian 1954-Treaty exposed the hollowness of the non-aligned approach, and a failure also. Tibet, which was independent till the British left the Sub-continent in 1947, fell to the Chinese aggression and subsequent occupation in 1950. Tibet had an independent history of several centuries, and the British policy was designed in a way to make its independence and territorial integrity inviolable. The British feared the Chinese design. India should have continued with the British Tibetan policy when it inherited the system as a result of the transfer of power in 1947. But, instead of protecting independence of Tibet, it allowed China to annex and occupy the territory of Tibet through military intervention, repudiating the obligation it had inherited from the British with regard to Tibet's independence. India's acquiescence to Chinese forceful and illegal occupation of Tibet, and subsequent acceptance of Tibet, being a 'Region' of China was in a sharp contrast to the New Delhi 'conclave' that was held in 1949 to protest against the Dutch colonial policy in Indonesia. Accepting Tibet as a 'Region' of China in the 1954-Treaty, India itself raised the question on the 'validity' of the boundary with China, particularly, the McMahon Line. With regard to its non-aligned approach to China, geopolitics at the regional level, during its formative stage, was a failure, but in case of Sri-Lanka, at the local level, was one of intervention to re-install the government of Mr. Bandaranayke.

A meeting of twenty-nine countries of the Afro-Asian continental realm took place in 1955 at Bandung.

This actually included a broad cross-section of countries of both the continents, including Communist China and North Vietnam, and pro-Western Japan and Philippines etc. In fact, it was attended by countries, belonging to both the mutually exclusive collective alliances. India and China were the key players at the Bandung conference. However, Pakistan did not attend it. The conference was a moral success no doubt, and was more of importance for symbolic reasons, but at the same time it lacked 'pragmatism', so far as the genuineness and relevance of the approach in the fast growing and changing international geopolitics was concerned.

Nevertheless, the first meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement took place at Belgrade in 1961, attended by twenty-six countries, but the countries in alliance with either super power were not invited. China, North Vietnam, Japan, and Philippines were eliminated, including Pakistan for their alleged membership to these military alliances and active participation in the operational processes of these alliances against each other.

The Non-Aligned Movement was the joint product of three great statesmen of the contemporary world: Nehru of India, Tito of Yugoslavia and Nasser of Egypt. The Suez crisis in 1956, resulting from the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel, all belonging to the NATO alliance, prompted India to support Egypt. It was a moral support, nothing more than that. Similarly India gave moral support to Tito, who was attempting to forge an independence from the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. 'Hence, for both Egypt and Yugoslavia, their interest in a Non-Aligned movement was to find broad global support in their efforts to remain independent of the Cold War powers. India, on the other hand, had no such immediate threat and saw the movement as a vehicle for playing its role as a world power.... The Non-Aligned Movement was actively involved in supporting anti-colonial revolutions and was vehemently against the Cold War assumption that all countries had to choose sides in the Great Contest (Taylor & Flint 2000 / 2004: 101). The territorial pattern, coming out of the movement, perhaps manifested a genuine precursor to a geopolitical transition to Galtung's 'World Classes' world order (1975).

Galtung (1975) had proposed four alternative future geopolitical scenarios that appeared to transcend the Cold War. The first was the development of super-state rivalry based upon these ten units. In this scenario, there would be ten super-states in a perennial world of trading wars as each vied for economic advantage. In the second geopolitical scenario, each unit/super-state would try to protect its economy by promoting autarky. The end result of such a process would be the rediscovery of pan-regions as Northern super-states combine their Southern neighbours. Since there were only four Northern super-states, this could produce four pan-regions, which might or might not include India and China. In the third scenario, he put North against South (Japan, USA, European Union, Soviet Union against China, South-East Asia, Latin America, Africa, Middle East, India). Galtung termed these states 'world classes'. This was a 'third-world list' view of the world politics, represented in the past by China's or India's claim to be the leader of the third world against the combined might of the USA and the Soviet Union. This type of thinking of geopolitical structuration was closely related to the social analyses from which world-systems analysis could be derived. There is no denying the fact that India held precedence over China in terms of 'leading the third world countries vis-à-vis the mutually exclusive military alliances' in the contemporary world. The Non-Aligned Movement was a success, because it caused revolt in the periphery against the colonial powers, leading to independence and de-colonization of the Afro-Asian nations, despite a few of them moving into the folds of the alliances. India's uncommitted neutral approach, undoubtedly, held success at the global level because more and more states believed in the relevance of the movement that sought 'balance of peace, rather than, balance of power', in the world geopolitical order. Nevertheless, the movement did not cause what may be called 'a geopolitical paradigm-shift' in the contemporary scenario, because the destiny of the world was still in the hands of the alliances, facing each other in a belligerent way.



**Signing of Shimla Accord**

But, at the regional level, the neutral approach did not yield any significant success rather there was acute rivalry with China for the leadership of the newly-emerged third world countries of the Asian realm, and with Pakistan, the rivalry concentrated on a number of factors, such as communalism, refugee problems, water disputes and the Kashmir. In fact, both India and Pakistan inherited a conflictual relationship with hardened cleavages, and mutual exclusiveness, necessarily based on the 'two-nation theory'. Both, India and Pakistan were born out of the same Indian nation, however, along the communal-religious pattern. Muslim areas in the northwest, and in the eastern Gangetic delta of the eastern region of the subcontinent were grouped and organized as independent Muslim nation-state of Pakistan (West and East Pakistan), of course, with a 'divided' geopolitical shape.

In spite of being born from the same Mother Indian Nation as twin-sisters, both India and Pakistan became enemy to each other, and the cleavage that developed as a result of religious mistrust, and extremism widened to the extent as to have caused geopolitical rivalry in the subcontinent. The non-aligned was of no use at the regional level. And Pakistan renounced the Panchshila-the five principles of peace, as being useless, and without any solid foundation of recognized, and approved standard international behaviour, rather, utopian, and philosophical lacking in realism'.

In the words of Rosenthal (1956): 'Indeed a good part of India's foreign policy is based on Pakistan'. Pakistan was at once India's 'first line of defense' and the nearest neighbour, and at the same time the source or object of India's deepest concerns in its regional geopolitics. 'In fact, in view of the past relationships of the people who now inhabit the two countries and in view of their inescapable intimacy, the relations between India and Pakistan might well be treated as aspects of domestic rather than of foreign policies' (Palmer 1961: 245).



In their attitudes towards each other India and Pakistan were greatly handicapped by a communal past, the tragedy of partition, and a long series of issues which sustained friction between them since independence. But, the most important being the question of the accession of Jammu & Kashmir to the Indian Union on October 26, 1947. Pakistan disapproved the accession of the State to India. India and Pakistan nearly became involved in a war over the territory in 1948. Since January 1, 1949, a cease-fire has prevailed. Jammu & Kashmir has been in fact divided along the cease-fire line. Jammu & Kashmir got divided with a bulk of the northern and mountainous Kashmir, including Gilgit went under Pakistan's control. Roughly, 83,100 square kilometers (one-third of the total area) of Jammu & Kashmir went under Pakistan's control. Pakistan has never accepted Kashmir's accession with India, rather, it called for a plebiscite to ascertain peoples' view whether they political conditions in South Asia. On the other hand, India had the communist bloc on her long northern frontiers, along the Himalayan and Trans-Himalayan mountains. Relations with China, particularly, with regards to the boundary and / or frontier had never been cordial since the late nineteenth century, particularly since the disappearance of the Russian threats in the Ladakh, following the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1897, when China attempted to push forward its southern boundaries beyond the centuries-old customary-traditional line, along the Himalayan and the Trans-Himalayan mountains. Sino-Indian boundary relations were historically disputed. And, right from the beginning, even during the British period, China was considered to be India's 'enemy' number one, because it had attempted to tamper with the long-settled traditional and customary boundary line along the high crest-cum-watershed of the Himalayas, and the Trans-Himalayas.

Therefore, the failure of the non-aligned approach vis-à-vis Panchshila in terms of the Sino-Indian border relations in the 50s and early 60s of the last century was not surprising, rather, it was a century-old geopolitical reality that simply revived, when both, India and China became free of foreign control. So long as the British governed India, China preferred a cautious acquiescence, but once the British left, the dragon became active to cause troubles to India, staking claims over Ladakh, and NEFA (presently the Arunachal Pradesh of the Union of India). India's acquiescence on China's military activism in Tibet in the early 50s of the last century, and its subsequent occupation, and incorporation in Chinese politico-administrative system, and India's agreeing to accept Tibet as a political region of China in the Sino-Indian Friendship Treaty, signed on April 29, 1954, simply manifested an inherent weakness in the non-aligned geopolitical code. India could not oppose Chinese military action in Tibet. Tibet was independent till its occupation by the Chinese forces. Succumbing to Chinese pressure on Tibet issue was a serious strategic blunder that India committed, placing the entire Himalayan boundary vulnerable to Chinese aggression and invasion. Was it not a reflection of weakness at the regional level of the paradigm of the non-aligned geopolitical code that India felt proud of carrying forward in international arena?

Chinese pressure and outward expansion continued beyond the crest-cum-watershed of the Himalayas and the Trans-Himalayas until it occupied forward posts in Ladakh, and in NEFA, particularly, in the Twang area, and it went on till it invaded India in 1962. India lost thousands of square-kilometers of area in the Ladakh region in the north-western frontier, and in the Arunachal Pradesh, in the north-eastern frontier, China claimed over more than 40 thousand square-kilometers of area. There is no recognized boundary between India and China; it is just 'a line of actual control', particularly since the Chinese aggression in 1962. India's failure to contain the Sino-Pakistani Border Agreement on March 02, 1963, involving a part of Northern Kashmir was, yet another example of failure at the regional level of the non-aligned approach. In 1968, China successfully detonated a nuclear device, despite a strong world-wide protest. China, thus, joined the USA, USSR, UK, and France as a nuclear power State. China had already separated herself from the Soviet-led continental Eurasian power bloc. Faced with hostile US-led military alliance on the one hand and 'enemy' Soviet Union on the other hand, perhaps compelled China to go for nuclear deterrence against them, but for India, it was a potential source of concern.



### **Heads of Two World Powers**

China had already occupied bulk of the Ladakh territory, and threatened mobilization across the McMahon Line. With China becoming a nuclear power, the relevance of the non-aligned geopolitical code was put to test that needed a more pragmatic geopolitical code which could rival China's approach.

Just as the Indian sub-continental plate has a tendency to constantly rub and push against the Eurasian tectonic plate, causing friction and volatility in the entire Himalayan mountain range, India's bilateral relationship with China is also a subtle, unseen, but ongoing and deeply felt collision, the affects of which have left a convoluted lineage. Tensions between the two powers have come to influence everything from their military and security decisionmaking to their economic and diplomatic maneuvering, with implications for wary neighbors and faraway allies alike. The relationship is complicated by layers of rivalry, mistrust, and occasional cooperation, not to mention actual geographical disputes.

Distant neighbors buffered by Tibet and the Himalayas for millennia, China and India became next-door neighbors with contested frontiers and disputed histories in 1950, following the occupation of Tibet by Mao's People's Liberation Army (PLA). While the rest of the world started taking note of China's rise during the last decade of the twentieth century, India has been warily watching China's rise ever since a territorial dispute erupted in a brief but full-scale war in 1962, followed by skirmishes in 1967 and 1987. Several rounds of talks held since 1981 have failed to resolve the disputed claims. During his last visit to India, in 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao dashed any hopes of early border settlement, stating that it would take a very long time to settle the boundary issue—a situation that in many ways works to Beijing's advantage. An unsettled border provides China the strategic leverage to keep India uncertain about its intentions, and nervous about its capabilities, while exposing India's vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and encouraging New Delhi's "good behavior" on issues of vital concern. Besides, as the ongoing unrest and growing incidents of self-immolations by Buddhist monks in Tibet show, Beijing has

not yet succeeded in pacifying and Sinicizing Tibet, as it has Inner Mongolia. The net result is that the 2,520-mile Sino-Indian frontier, one of the longest inter-state boundaries in the world, remains China's only undefined land border. It is also becoming heavily militarized, as tensions rise over China's aggressive patrolling on the line of actual control (LAC) and its military drills, using live ammunition, for a potential air and land campaign to capture high-altitude mountain passes in Tibet.

Over the last decade, the Chinese have put in place a sophisticated military infrastructure in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) adjoining India: five fully operational air bases, several helipads, an extensive rail network, and thirty thousand miles of roads—giving them the ability to rapidly deploy thirty divisions (fifteen thousand soldiers each) along the border, a three-to-one advantage over India. China has not only increased its military presence in Tibet but is also ramping up its nuclear arsenal. In addition, the PLA's strategic options against India are set to multiply as Chinese land and rail links with Pakistan, Nepal, Burma, and Bangladesh improve.

Developments on the disputed Himalayan borders are central to India's internal debate about the credibility of its strategic deterrent and whether to test nuclear weapons again. India is far more concerned about the overall military balance tilting to its disadvantage. India sees China everywhere because of Beijing's "hexiaogongda" policy in South Asia: "uniting with the small"—Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma, and Sri Lanka—"to counter the big"—India. When combined with Chinese nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan and building of port facilities around India's periphery, and a dramatic increase in the PLA's incursions and transgressions across the LAC, the official Indian perception of China has undergone a dramatic shift since 2006, with China now being widely seen as posing a major security threat in the short to medium term rather than over the long term. The Indian military, long preoccupied with war-fighting scenarios against Pakistan, has consequently turned its attention to the China border, and unveiled a massive force modernization program, to cost \$100 billion over the next decade, that includes the construction of several strategic roads and the expansion of rail networks, helipads, and airfields all along the LAC. Other measures range from raising a new mountain strike corps and doubling force levels in the eastern sector by one hundred thousand troops to the deployment of Sukhoi Su-30MKI aircraft, spy drones, helicopters, and ballistic and cruise missile squadrons to defend its northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, territory three times the size of Taiwan that the Chinese invaded in 1962 and now claim sovereignty over as "Southern Tibet."

Propelled by incidents related to border disputes, Chinese opposition to the US-India nuclear energy deal, India's angst over the growing trade deficit due to perceived Chinese unfair trade practices, potential Chinese plans to dam the Brahmaputra River, and the "war talk" in the official Chinese media in the 2007 to 2009 period (reminding India not to forget "the lessons of 1962"), mutual distrust between the Indian and Chinese people is growing. Clearly, China's extraordinary economic performance over the last three decades has changed the dynamics of the relationship. China and India had similar average incomes in the late 1970s, but thirty years later they find themselves at completely different stages of development. China's economic reforms—launched in 1978, nearly thirteen years before India's in 1991—changed their subsequent growth trajectories by putting China far ahead of India in all socioeconomic indices. Both China's gross domestic product and military expenditure are now three times the size of India's; recent surveys conducted by Pew Global Research show a growth in popular distrust, with just twenty-five percent of Indians holding a favorable view of China in 2011, down from thirty-four percent in 2010 and fifty-seven percent in 2005. Likewise, just twenty-seven percent of Chinese hold a favorable view of India in 2011, down from thirty-two percent in 2010, with studies of Internet content showing a large degree of "hostility and contempt for India."



**BRICS leaders (From L) Indian Prime minister Manmohan Singh, Chinese President Xi Jinping, South African President Jacob Zuma, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and Russian President Vladimir Putin, pose for a photo in Durban, South Africa, on March 27,**

Nor is there much effort to keep these emotions submerged. Reacting to the test launch in mid-April of a long-range Agni-V ballistic missile, dubbed the “China killer” by India’s news media, a Chinese daily wryly noted that “India stands no chance in an overall arms race with China,” because “China’s nuclear power is stronger and more reliable.” The unequal strategic equation, in particular the Chinese perception of India as a land of irreconcilable socio religious cleavages with an inherently unstable polity and weak leadership that is easily contained through proxies, aggravates tensions between the two. In 2008, an official reassessment of China’s capabilities and intentions led the Indian military to adopt a “two-front war” doctrine against what is identified as a “collusive threat” posed by two closely aligned nuclear-armed neighbors, Pakistan and China. This doctrine validates the long-held belief of India’s strategic community that China is following a protracted strategy of containing India’s rise.

India is also responding by strengthening its strategic links with Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Burma—countries on China’s periphery. In testimony to the US Senate in February, James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, noted that “the Indian military is strengthening its forces in preparation to fight a limited conflict along the disputed border, and is working to balance Chinese power projection in the Indian Ocean. That “balance” includes a strategic tilt toward the United States that has also had a damaging effect on Sino-Indian relations.

Although leaders from both countries often repeat the ritualized denials of conflict and emphasize burgeoning trade ties, such platitudes cannot obliterate the trust deficit. Few if any of China’s strategic thinkers seem to hold positive views of India for China’s future, and vice versa. Chinese strategists keep a wary eye on India’s “great power dreams,” its military spending and weapons acquisitions, and the developments in India’s naval and nuclear doctrines. A dominant theme in Chinese commentary in the last decade is that India’s growing strength—backed by the United States—could tip Asia’s balance of power away from Beijing.

Not surprisingly, bilateral relations between Asia's giants remain, in the words of Zhang Yan, China's ambassador to India, "very fragile, very easy to be damaged, and very difficult to repair." Both have massive manpower resources, a scientific and industrial base, and million-plus militaries. For the first time in more than fifty years, both are moving upward simultaneously on their relative power trajectories. As the pivotal power in South Asia, India perceives itself much as China has traditionally perceived itself in relation to East Asia. Both desire a peaceful security environment to focus on economic development and avoid overt rivalry or conflict. Still, the volatile agents of nationalism, history, ambition, strength, and size produce a mysterious chemistry. Neither power is comfortable with the rise of the other. Both seek to envelop neighbors with their national economies. Both are nuclear and space powers with growing ambitions. Both yearn for a multi polar world that will provide them the space for growth and freedom of action. Both vie for leadership positions in global and regional organizations and have attempted to establish a sort of Monroe Doctrine in their respective neighborhoods—without much success.

And both remain suspicious of each other's long-term agenda and intentions. Each perceives the other as pursuing hegemony and entertaining imperial ambitions. Both are non-status quo powers: China in terms of *territory*, power, and influence; India in terms of *status*, power, and influence. Both seek to expand their power and influence in and beyond their regions at each other's expense. China's "Malacca paranoia" is matched by India's "Hormuz dilemma." If China's navy is going south to the Indian Ocean, India's navy is going east to the Pacific Ocean. Both suffer from a siege mentality born out of their elites' acute consciousness of the divisive tendencies that make their countries' present political unity so fragile. After all, much of Chinese and Indian history is made up of long periods of internal disunity and turmoil, when centrifugal forces brought down even the most powerful empires. Each has its vulnerabilities—regional conflicts, poverty, and religious divisions for India; the contradiction between a market economy and Leninist politics for China. Both are plagued with domestic linguistic, ethno-religious, and politico-economic fault lines that could be their undoing if not managed properly.

In other words, China and India are locked in a classic security dilemma: one country sees its actions as defensive, but the same actions appear aggressive to the other. Beijing fears that an unrestrained Indian power—particularly one that is backed by the West and Japan—would not only threaten China's security along its restive southwestern frontiers (Tibet and Xinjiang) but also obstruct China's expansion southwards. Faced with exponential growth in China's power and influence, India feels the need to take counterbalancing measures and launch strategic initiatives to emerge as a great power, but these are perceived as challenging and threatening in China.

China's use of regional and international organizations to institutionalize its power while either denying India access to these organizations or marginalizing India within them has added a new competitive dynamic to the relationship. In the past decade, India has found itself ranged against China at the UN Security Council, East Asia Summit, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Asian Development Bank. In 2009, China vetoed a development plan for India by the latter in the disputed Arunachal Pradesh, thereby internationalizing a bilateral territorial dispute. In a tit-for-tat response, New Delhi has kept Beijing out of India-led multilateral frameworks such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue, and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation forums, and rejected China's request to be included as observer or associate member into the 33-member Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, started by India in 2008.

Resource scarcity has added a maritime dimension to this geopolitical rivalry. As China's and India's energy dependence on the Middle East and Africa increases, both are actively seeking to forge closer defense and security ties with resource supplier nations (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Iran), and to develop appropriate naval capabilities to dominate the sea lanes through which the bulk of their commerce flows. Since seventy-seven percent of China's oil comes from the Middle East and Africa, Beijing has increased

its activities in the Indian Ocean region by investing in littoral states' economies, building ports and infrastructure, providing weaponry, and acquiring energy resources. Nearly ninety percent of Chinese arms sales go to countries located in the Indian Ocean region. Beijing is investing heavily in developing the Gwadar deep-sea port in Pakistan, and naval bases in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Whether one calls it a "string of pearls" or a series of places at which China's navy can base or simply be resupplied, that navy is setting up support infrastructure in strategic locations along the same sea lanes of communication that could neutralize India's geographical advantage in the Indian Ocean region. A recent commentary from the official Xinhua news outlet called for setting up three lines of navy supply bases in the northern Indian Ocean, the western Indian Ocean, and the southern Indian Ocean. It stated: "China needs to establish overseas strategic support stations for adding ship fuel, re-supply of necessities, staff break time, repairs of equipment, and weapons in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, which will be the core support bases in the North Indian Ocean supply line; Djibouti, Yemen, Oman, Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique, which will be the core support bases in the West Indian Ocean supply line; and Seychelles and Madagascar, which will be the core support bases in the South Indian Ocean supply line." For its part, New Delhi is pursuing the same strategy as Beijing and creating its own web of relationships with the littoral states, both bilaterally and multilaterally, through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, to ensure that if the military need arises, the necessary support infrastructure and network will be in place. India has also stepped up defense cooperation with Oman and Israel in the west, while upgrading military ties with the Maldives, Madagascar, and Myanmar in the Indian Ocean, and with Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, Japan, and the United States in the east. In December 2006, Admiral Suresh Mehta, then India's naval chief, expanded the conceptual construct of India's "greater strategic neighborhood" to include potential sources of oil and gas imports located across the globe—from Venezuela to the Sakhalin Islands in Russia. The Indian navy currently has a stronger naval presence on the Indian Ocean than does China. It is strengthening its port infrastructure with new southern ports, which allow greater projection into the ocean. Taking a leaf out of China's book, the new focus is to develop anti-access and area-denial capabilities that will thwart any Chinese attempt at encirclement or sea-access denial.

In short, maritime competition is intensifying as Indian and Chinese navies show the flag in the Pacific and Indian oceans with greater frequency. This rivalry could spill into the open after a couple of decades, when one Indian aircraft carrier will be deployed in the Pacific Ocean and one Chinese aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean—ostensibly to safeguard their respective trade and energy routes.

In turn, India's "Look East" policy is a manifestation of its own strategic intent to compete for influence in the wider Asia-Pacific region. Just as China will not concede India's primacy in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, India seems unwilling to accept Southeast and East Asia as China's sphere of influence. Just as China's rise is viewed positively in the South Asian region among the small countries surrounding India with which New Delhi has had difficult relations, India's rise is viewed in positive-sum terms among China's neighbors throughout East and Southeast Asia. Over the last two decades, India has sought to enhance its economic and security ties with those Northeast and Southeast Asian nations (Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and Australia) that worry about China more than any other major power. As China's growing strength creates uneasiness in the region, India's balancing role is welcome within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to influence China's behavior in cooperative directions. While the Southeast Asian leaders seek to deter China from utilizing its growing strength for coercive purposes and to maintain regional autonomy, Indian strategic analysts favor an Indian naval presence in the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean to counter Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. On maritime security, Southeast Asians seem more willing to cooperate with India than China, especially in the Strait of Malacca.

A key element of India's Pacific outreach has been regular naval exercises, port calls, security dialogues, and more than a dozen defense cooperation agreements. India has welcomed Vietnam's offer of berthing



rights in Na Trang Port in the South China Sea, and news reports suggest that India might offer BrahMos cruise missiles and other military hardware at “friendship prices” to Vietnam. The conclusion of free-trade agreements with Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, Japan, and the ASEAN, coupled with New Delhi’s participation in multilateral forums such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Plus Eight defense ministers’ meetings, have also reinforced strategic ties. India’s determination to strengthen its strategic partnership with Japan and Vietnam, commitment to pursue joint oil exploration with Hanoi in the South China Sea waters in the face of Chinese opposition, and an emphasis on the freedom of navigation are signs of India maneuvering to be seen as a counterweight to Chinese power in East Asia. New Delhi is also scaling up defense ties with Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra.

The US-India partnership is also emerging as an important component of India’s strategy to balance China’s power. India seeks US economic and technological assistance. It helps this relationship that India’s longtime security concerns—China and Pakistan—also now happen to be the United States’ long-term and immediate strategic concerns as well. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have encouraged India’s involvement in a wider Asian security system to balance a rising China and declining Japan. Apparently, US weakness—real or perceived—invites Chinese assertiveness. Since the United States does not wish to see Asia dominated by a single hegemonic power or a coalition of states, India’s economic rise is seen as serving Washington’s long-term interests by ensuring that there be countervailing powers in Asia—China, Japan, and India, with the United States continuing to act as an “engaged offshore power balancer.”

The “India factor” is increasingly entering the ongoing US policy debate over China. Asia-Pacific is now the Indo-Pacific, a term underlining the centrality of India in the new calculus of regional power. The 2010 US Quadrennial Defense Review talked of India’s positive role as a “net security provider in the Indian Ocean and beyond.” India’s “Look East” policy, which envisions high-level engagement with “China-wary” nations (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Australia), dovetails with the US policy of establishing closer ties with countries beyond Washington’s traditional treaty partners to maintain US predominance. The US-Indian strategic engagement, coupled with India’s expanding naval and nuclear capabilities and huge economic potential, have made India loom larger on China’s radar screen. An editorial in a Shanghai daily last November lamented the fact that “India will not allow itself to stay quietly between the US and China. It wants to play triangle affairs with the duo, and will do anything it can to maximize its benefit out of it. Therefore, China will find it hard to buy India over.” The Chinese fear that the Indian-American cooperation in defense, high-tech R&D, nuclear, space, and maritime spheres would prolong US hegemony and prevent the establishment of a post-American, Sino-centric hierarchical regional order in Asia. This tightening relationship, and the possibility that what is presently a tilt on India’s part could turn into a full-fledged alignment, is a major reason for recent deterioration in Chinese-Indian relations.

Although these relations remain unstable and competitive, both have sought to reduce tensions. Despite border disputes, denial of market access, and harsh words against the Dalai Lama, leaders in both countries understand the dangers of allowing problems to overwhelm the relationship. Burgeoning economic ties between the world’s two fastest-growing economies have become the most salient aspect of their bilateral relationship. Trade flows have risen rapidly, from a paltry \$350 million in 1993 to \$70 billion in 2012, and could surpass \$100 billion by 2015. Several joint ventures in power generation, consumer goods, steel, chemicals, minerals, mining, transport, infrastructure, info-tech, and telecommunication are in the works. Intensifying trade, commerce, and tourism could eventually raise the stakes for China in its relationship with India. On the positive side, both share common interests in maintaining regional stability (for example, combating Islamist fundamentalists), exploiting economic opportunities, and maintaining access to energy sources, capital, and markets.

Despite ever-increasing trade volumes, however, there is as yet no strategic congruence between China and India. As in the case of Sino-US and Sino-Japanese ties, Sino-Indian competitive tendencies, rooted

in geopolitics and nationalism, are unlikely to be easily offset even by growing economic and trade links. In fact, the economic relationship is heavily skewed. The bulk of Indian exports to China consist of iron ore and other raw materials, while India imports mostly manufactured goods from China—a classic example of the dependency model. Most Indians see China as predatory in trade. New Delhi has lodged the largest number of anti-dumping cases against Beijing in the World Trade Organization. India is keener on pursuing mutual economic dependencies with Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations through increased trade, investment, infrastructure development, and aid to bolster economic and political ties across Asia that will counter Chinese power.

Even as a range of economic and transnational issues draw them closer together, the combination of internal issues of stability (Tibet and Kashmir), disputes over territory, competition over resources (oil, gas, and water), overseas markets and bases, external overlapping spheres of influence, rival alliance relationships, and ever-widening geopolitical horizons forestall the chances for a genuine Sino-Indian accommodation. Given the broad range of negative attitudes and perceptions each country has for the other, it is indeed remarkable that China and India have been able to keep diplomatic relations from fraying. How long this situation can last is more and more uncertain as each country is increasingly active in what would once have been seen as the other's "backyard" and both engage in strategic maneuvers to checkmate each other.

Just as China has become more assertive vis-à-vis the United States, Indian policy toward China is becoming tougher. India's evolving Asia strategy reflects the desire for an arc of partnerships with China's key neighbors—in Southeast Asia and further east along the Asia-Pacific rim—and the United States that would help neutralize the continuing Chinese military assistance and activity around its own territory and develop counter-leverages of its own vis-à-vis China to keep Beijing sober. At this point, the two heavyweights circle each other warily, very much aware that their feints and jabs could turn into a future slugging match.

Although, the non-aligned geopolitics was a necessity for India, on account of its political location on the threshold of the non-communist capitalist maritime power blocs and the communist continental power bloc of the Eurasian realm, with each putting its pressure to bring India into their military and political folds, but India preferred a middle-path, i. e., an uncommitted approach towards each other. To look at the Cohen's model (1973) South Asia was conceived of as 'an independent, rather small geostrategic region, hemmed in between the Trade-Dependent Maritime World, dominated by the traditional maritime powers, literally by the United States of America, and the Eurasian Continental World, dominated by the USSR and China on the one hand, and in between two 'shatter-belts: Middle East and South-East Asia, these are characterized by lack of political unity, political fragmentation, but are caught in between the contrasting interests of the two major geostrategic regions.'

Was this independent characteristic of South Asian geostrategic region (minus Pakistan) geographically destined, or politically destined? Was the non-aligned geopolitics that India put into its image-plan with regard to its foreign policy, a mere reflection of this geopolitical pattern that Cohen (1973) visualized? May be in terms of consistent pressure from mutually exclusive emerging political realities and patterns since the end of the Second World War that India preferred such geopolitics which was more or less a geopolitical necessity during the formative phase of its federation, but it was definitely a failure at the regional level, because India and Pakistan, in spite of being born from the same Mother Nation, continued rivalry to the extent of outbreak of wars, and China, despite being subject to foreign rule and exploitation like India, adopted a belligerent attitude toward India to the level as to have invaded India. China has consistently renounced India's Panchshila paradigm to resolve the centuries-old border disputes.

To, Pakistan, the Panchshila paradigm in the field of international relations that India attempted to put forward and / or carry forward to resolve political crises in the post-war world, lacked pragmatism, and could not be the basis of resolving territorial conflicts, and disputes. Instead of peaceful resolution to the conflicts, and disputes, Pakistan all the time favoured ‘hostile’ solution through military activism, to resolve the Kashmir conflict. It was the period of ‘containment and (nuclear) deterrence: the US world model, and Pakistan got itself fitted in that model against India, though the model was designed to counter-balance USSR’s basic strategic advantage on account of its ‘superior’ geopolitical position, beside a strong military prowess. Pakistan had no threats from the USSR, so, there was no need for Pakistan to get into the US model of world: containment and (nuclear) deterrence, but its objective was to keep India under pressure, and constantly engaged.

Pakistan had always maintained a kind of ‘diplomatic’ superiority over India, in the sense that in spite of being an active member of the CENTO, and SEATO, which were designed against the continental communist power bloc, Pakistan succeeded in befriending China against India-an unholy alliance, but for that Pakistan was not reprimanded by the United States. Similarly, Chinese strategic friendship with Pakistan -a strategic partner of the USA, against India spoke of ‘entrapped geopolitics’ on the threshold of High Asia and South Asia, in which India was at the receiving end. The political complexities, arising out of the ‘emergent axis’ against India, at the regional level appeared to have made the non-aligned geopolitical code, rather, redundant.

The geopolitical pattern that emerged on account of growing Sino-Pakistani alliance against India somehow resembled to what Spykman (1944) wrote: ‘.....there has never really been a simple land power-sea power opposition. The historical alignment has always been in terms of some members of the rimland.....against some members of the rimland.....’. Pakistan being a part of the Asiatic rimland, however, got aligned with China-an emergent land power of the contemporary world, with nuclear capability against India, a member of the same Asiatic rimland, to which Pakistan belonged.



**The Indian Prime Minister with King Of Bhutan**

In September 1965 Pakistan with Chinese support again dared to engineer a massive infiltration into Kashmir across the 1949 cease-fire line with the object of changing the alignment, and to cause complete collapse of the rule of law in the state to the extent as to liberate the 'remaining' territory of Jammu & Kashmir. The infiltration was promptly followed by the Pakistani invasion, and war broke between India and Pakistan along the cease-fire line, and the Indian army, while driving out the infiltrators, and the Pakistani armed units beyond the cease-fire line, and the Indians succeeded to occupy two Pakistani outposts near Kargil, thus securing the vital route to the Ladakh-Chinese border and preventing any Sino-Pakistani link-up near Karakorum Pass. China had been consistently favouring Pakistan's support for 'Kashmir people's struggle for freedom and the right of national self-determination,' in spite of the fact that the Kashmiri had already approved of the accession to India which was ratified by the State Assembly. China issued an ultimatum warning India to stop the war, or to face the consequences. Chinese forces became 'active' along the 'actual line of control', in the Ladakh, and in the NEFA region. This was aimed at pressuring India to stop engaging the Pakistani forces in the Pak-occupied Kashmir. China accused India of intrusions over the border, especially at Nathu La. Chinese invasion loomed large over India, however, the Chinese threats receded in the face of the growing world-wide reaction to their ultimatum.



**Prime Ministers Of India And Japan**

The USA, and the UK had extended their moral support to Pakistan, and made a 'covert' diplomatic attack on India, so that India could stop fighting in the Pak-occupied part of Kashmir. Break-up in the Eurasian continental power bloc, with China getting out of it, accusing the USSR deviating from the true Marxian ideology, had its impact on the geopolitics of South Asia, in the sense that the USSR came out openly in favour of India's stand on the Kashmir conflict, because it no other option

To quote Woodman (1969: 312): 'The US government made it very clear that if China took advantage of the Indo-Pakistan war, Mao Tse-tung could expect retaliation. The Soviet Union faced a complex dilemma: if Moscow joined with Washington in trying to end the war, China, as well as Afro-Asian communists would condemn her as betraying communism; if she took no action, then the USA would extend her influence in the Indian sub-continent; if her weight were thrown on India's side, Pakistan might become a satellite of China.'

Given the emerging geopolitical trend following Chinese ultimatum, warning India of consequences if it continued with 'military build-ups' along the Sino-Sikkimese boundary (?), and growing Chinese influence in the politics of the sub-continent, compelled the USSR to side and / to favour India, but it was not without intention, rather, what they wanted was to bring India into their strategic fold, against both USA and China, so that they could secure a strong foot-hold on the sub-continent. The USSR pledged support to India's non-aligned geopolitical code. The September 1965 India-Pakistan war continued for 17-day, however, without any sincere attempt on the part of the world community to end the war, though the Security Council of the UNO called for cease-fire. Chinese intervention had demonstrated to the world her extraordinary combination of strategic withdrawal and propaganda bravado. The United Nations emerged as an effective arbitrator and the Soviet succeeded in the unaccustomed role of a mediator by bringing Pakistan and India to the conference table at Tashkent on January 10, 1966. The basis of the Tashkent agreement was the paradigm of Panchshila. But, the spirit of Tashkent soon evaporated, and the optimism proved short-lived.

The construction of the Karakorum highway across the Pak-occupied Kashmir in 1967, linking Chinese Xingjian (Sin kiang) Province with the Pakistani Province Sind-vis-à-vis the Karachi Port proved to be great strategic disadvantage for India. Sino-Pakistani military build-up and cooperation grew stronger and stronger. And this military build-up, as a part of the Sino-Pakistani strategic partnership was neither aimed at the US strategic model nor against the USSR, rather, it was aimed at India, and against India's practicing non-aligned approach. The balance of power was always in Pakistan's favour, ever since Pakistan became an active member of the of the US world model, besides being a Chinese strategic ally against India. Being a strong admirer, and believer in the paradigm of Panchshila vis-a-vis non-aligned geopolitical code, India had always renounced the concept of balance of power on the ground that it caused arms race in the region, and might lead to war.

However, It was quite pertinent to see the US acquiescence on Pakistan's growing strategic partnership with their arch rival, China, against India. Was the US acquiescence, a part of their grand geopolitical strategy to see India strategically weakened to the extent as to come to terms with Pakistan on the Kashmir conflict?

In view of this complicated geopolitical scenario in the South Asia-visà-vis the world, India's geopolitical stand in its non-aligned approach, was not in keeping with the realities, rather, contradictory to her interests. A slight change in her non-aligned approach seemed to be a political necessity as she had to 'confront' with Pakistan, China and the USA on her soil. The USSR also required a South Asiatic 'rimland' strategic partner to contain growing threat from the USA, and sought to neutralize Chinese growing presence in the region. There was something common in the interests of both, continental Russia,

and maritime, rather, 'rimland' India that the two joined hands to give a new outlook to their bilateral relations, by agreeing to forge a 'strategic relation and defense pact', to sustain their defense requirements, and to protect their strategic vulnerability.



**Bangladesh's Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, meets India's president, Pranab Mukherjee.**

It was in September 1971, India and Soviet Union signed the first 'defense agreement', known as the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-Operation for twenty years. It was a departure from the Nehruvian geopolitical code. Had Nehru been alive, he would not have allowed the Indo-Soviet strategic Treaty, and at the same time, would not have favoured the disintegration of Pakistan vis-a vis the creation of Bangladesh. He was conscious of his international stature as an 'apostle' of peace. Contemporary historians and politicians held him responsible for all kinds of disputes with the neighbours. Even to-day people have the same view that whatever problems India has with Pakistan and China, are the results of Nehru's mishandling of the situations.

With the signing of the treaty, the regional balance of power that used to be in Pakistan's favour, some how changed. It gave rise to a new strategic dynamism in the sub-continent, however, in the form of arms race. India was required to be a little bit hostile toward Pakistan, given the fast changing political scenario in East Pakistan following the army crack-down on the innocent Bengalis, which had caused massive refugee problem in India. The war of independence began in East Pakistan. India supported the freedom struggle in East Pakistan in violation of one of the five principles of peace, because a 'dismembered' Pakistan was always in her strategic advantage in the subcontinent.

Abandoning the paradigm of Panchshila, India became active to make East Pakistan an independent State,



and this was made possible because of the Indo-Soviet defense treaty.

The 1971 war with Pakistan was decisive for India for so many reasons: an independent Bangladesh came into being in place of East Pakistan, and the new nation was quickly recognized by the world community ; the US warship, Enterprise that moved across the Bay of Bengal with the object of helping Pakistan in the war, particularly to see that Pakistan retained its sovereignty in East Pakistan, had to return back without helping Pakistan for fear of being attacked by the Soviet warships, present in the region; Chinese role was, rather, ambiguous this time, probably because of the threats of the Soviet intervention. India's position became pre-eminently strong after the war. In fact the war ended with the entire Pakistani army, numbering nearly one lakh, in East Pakistan and / or Bangladesh, surrendering before the Indian army as prisoner of war (PWO). This time again Pakistan attempted to 'distort' the 1949 cease-fire line in Jammu & Kashmir, during the war, but could not succeed, rather, a substantial part of the Pak-occupied Kashmir came under Indian control, because the Indian army had moved beyond the cease-fire line, while driving out the invaders.

The 14-day war came to an end following a unilateral cease-fire on the western front, declared by India, that went in effect on December 17, 1971, at 20.00 hrs. However, the war on the eastern front came to an end following the surrender of the Pakistani army on December 16, 1971. It was a good opportunity for India to settle the Kashmir problem for ever, because Pakistan having been defeated in the war, was at a receiving end, and there was a public demand in Pakistan for immediate release of the Pakistani POW, lodged in different Indian jails, even at the cost of Kashmir. India could have used this Pakistani sentiment that POW would be repatriated only when Pakistan accepted Jammu & Kashmir's accession to India, and vacated the 'occupied' territory. But, instead of discussing this issue, India negotiated on the cease-fire line only, with the object of making it an international boundary between India and Pakistan across Jammu & Kashmir-accepting the status quo with regard to the division of the territory. The secret negotiations, some how, became public and there was strong protest in the country over the 'negotiated' arrangement on the cease-fire line. India's stand seemed to be ambiguous, rather, conflicting-a kind of 'blend of Nehruvian geopolitical code and real politics,'-emotion got clubbed together with reality. And, this ambiguous stand of India, greatly benefited Pakistan.

On July 02, 1972, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement. Both the sides agreed to withdraw their troops to the line before the out-break of the war on December 03, 1971, and to obtain and to identify it , it was resolved to give responsibility to the army commanders to prepare 25 maps to delineate 740 kilometers of long boundary line. It was further resolved to ,however, on India's insistence that a new line of control, the line on which the fighting ceased on December 17, 1971, be accepted as the new cease-fire line, which would be henceforth known as the 'line of control' (LOC), instead of the cease-fire line. It was further resolved that 'both sides would respect the position of either side without prejudice to the recognized position, beside easy repatriation of the POW.' In the Simla agreement one finds reflections of the Panchshila again.

The contents of the Simla Agreement revealed that India considered Jammu & Kashmir as a disputed territory, and that needed a peaceful resolution to the conflict. But the agreement appeared to have made the whole exercise of accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India doubtful. India should have pressurized Pakistan to recognize and accept the accession as final, before finalizing the terms and conditions for the agreement. It could have also pressurized Pakistan for vacating the occupied part. Pakistan

Although, the non-aligned geopolitical code was a necessity for India, on account of its political location on the threshold of the non-communist world have agreed, given the public opinion there, at the time, that (Pakistani citizens) they were interested not in Kashmir, but in the release of the Pakistani POW. But

nothing that sort happened. The Simla agreement was a diplomatic victory for Pakistan, and a failure for India's foreign policy.

### **HOSTILE AND AGGRESSIVE APPROACH: DEPARTURE FROM NEHRUVIAN PEACE IDEALS?**

India is almost surrounded by a number of neighbours, with whom her relations are not very cordial, rather, relations with China and Pakistan have never been smooth. China has consistently attempted to alter the line of actual control since the cessation of the war in 1962, in, both, the western sector and the eastern sector. China is a constant threat to India, and perhaps the enemy number one. Pakistan, ever since its dismemberment in December 1971, has been actively causing trouble to India in various ways. Moreover, the Sino-Pakistani strategic alliance against India for long has been a matter of serious concern, so far as the territorial integrity of the country is concerned. China is a nuclear power, but it holds under its occupation a substantial part of Ladakh since early 50s, similarly, a substantial part (almost one-third part) of Jammu & Kashmir is under illegal occupation of Pakistan since October 1947. Pakistan a very small country, compared to India's territorial size, but it often, however, together with China, threatens India. China is relatively powerful than India, and together with Pakistan, the power potentials of the two become huge to decide the destiny of the subcontinent (?)

It is in the background of the emerging geopolitical scenario as a result of growing Sino-Pakistani strategic and political alliance against India, there was a need to abandon the non-aligned approach, particularly at the regional level, and to replace it by a 'restraint' hostile and aggressive approach, particularly, towards China and Pakistan, if India were to survive. India, which had earlier renounced the balance of power theory in local, regional and international geopolitics as being 'sustainer' to arms race vis-à-vis rivalries, now realized its relevance in practical and real politics. The lose it suffered at the hands of Pakistan and China can only be compensated if it started its military build-up to the extent as to equal Pakistan and China, particularly, in terms of power potentials, so that a perfect balance of power could exist in the subcontinent. A new arms race set in, with Pakistan started acquiring arm and ammunitions from the USA and China, and from other NATO countries, India depending on the Soviet Union, for its arms requirements. The whole subcontinent came under the influence of the Cold War vis-à-vis the super confrontation.

The 'satellite' geopolitics, i. e. super power rivalries for the control of the sky began to push the world towards a nuclear holocaust (Bunge,1982) Despite the UN resolution of making the Indian Ocean, a zone of peace, it turned into an arena of intense super-power rivalries. The USA, which had purchased the Diego Garcia Islands in the Indian Ocean from the UK, started converting the island into a sophisticated military base, as a part of its nuclear deterrence strategic policy against the Soviet Union, despite strong protest from India and other littoral countries. It was in the midst of such intense geopolitical rivalries at the global level, with its impact in the subcontinent, and consistent Sino-Pakistani pressure, India detonated its first nuclear explosion in 1974 in Pokhran in Rajasthan. The detonation of a nuclear explosion marked the beginning of departure from the Nehruvian peace model to a more realistic, pragmatic 'aggressive' model, particularly at the regional level. Soon after India's detonation of a nuclear explosion, Pakistan with the Chinese help successfully detonated a nuclear explosion. Thus, a nuclear arms race began in the subcontinent. All these three neighbouring countries of the South Asia and High Asia: India, Pakistan and China with common boundaries, became nuclear powers, while the latter two were in an alliance against the former, and the balance went against India, again. But, India had a reason to be less concerned in that situation, because of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty that guaranteed safety and security to her in case of any potential military threats. The treaty was signed for twenty years, and it was due to expire in 1991. Naturally, there was no fear for India. India succeeded in preventing a regional alliance between her neighbours, against her, particularly, when Pakistan, under Chinese influence,

sought for their cooperation and collaboration for a kind of an alliance to stop India's growing military strength.

Neighbours, like, Myanmar (former Burma), Bangladesh, Sri-Lanka, and the Himalayan kingdoms, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan renounced to be drawn into the grand alliance that Pakistan proposed under Chinese influence, against India. Rather, Sikkim merged with India in 1975. China protested strongly against the merger, but of no use, because the merger was done through a referendum, and the Sikkimese overwhelmingly supported it. This time, China did not issue any ultimatum, warning India of severe consequences if it went ahead with the merger process. The Chinese reaction to the merger of Sikkim to India, merely confined to her verbal protest nothing more than that. Chinese attitude, therefore, revealed the fact that China realized India's growing military strength.

The merger of Sikkim, perhaps, marked the beginning of the success of India's re-defined / re-shaped geopolitical code that manifested a departure from the traditional Nehruvian approach, to a more realistic approach.

Indian army played a big role in the Island States of the Maldives, and Mauritius. Similarly, it intervened in the civil war in Sri-Lanka, where it army went to establish peace. India had stopped the entry of Pakistani soldiers, when the Sri-Lankan authority had sought for their help to suppress the Tamil rebellions. Although, India had adopted a policy of 'restraint' hostility in its geopolitical code, but it never went for an 'aggrandizement' foreign policy. India's re-defined foreign policy was designed towards maintaining her territorial integrity which had suffered most during the formative phase of its federation, when her territories were forcefully occupied by China and Pakistan. India had also warned Bangladesh when its border security forces made attempts to cross over the Bengal border. At one stage, Indian army had to move into Bangladesh to stop unprovoked firing by the Bangladesh Rifles over the Indian citizens. She had asked the Myanmar military junta to install democracy, and to release the pro-democracy leader who has been detained for long. Indian army had also moved into the Bhutanese territory to flush out the insurgent outfits, which had their camps, meant for anti-India operation.

With the shift of the global geopolitics from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, following the end of the super-power rivalry, and Cold War, India's responsibility to police the Indian Ocean, particularly, the Bay of Bengal region has increased. It is in this region of the Indian Ocean has increased the Chinese military (naval) pressure due to Myanmar's pro-Chinese policy. Chinese military (naval) presence has also been felt in the territorial waters of Pakistan. In view of this changing geopolitics in the Indian Ocean, India's role has become a necessity for her own security. Littoral countries, including South Africa and Australia also favour India's role to police the oceanic region.

India's 'restraint' hostility approach, particularly, towards her neighbours has also been conditioned the following pertinent factors: a) to take pre-emptive steps to foil any attempts by any of the neighbours

- a) to forceful occupation of territory, and to neutralize threats to the integrity of the Nation;
- b) to stop cross-border movements of insurgents, particularly in the northeastern region, from Myanmar, Bangladesh, China, also from Nepal;
- c) to stop cross-border terrorism along the line of control in Jammu &

Kashmir. Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and to an extent Nepal have been sustaining several insurgent groups of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, and Pak-Occupied Kashmir, which are fighting against Indian Government for independence of their territories. These neighbouring

countries are providing all kinds of help to these insurgent groups with the object of territorializing secessionism in the border areas to the extent as to cause disintegration of India.

Could the Nehruvian geopolitical code be viable to contain the cross-border insurgency, and cross-border terrorism, being sustained by the neighbours?

Since 1980, Pakistan has been sustaining terrorism in India. First, it disturbed the Punjab state of India for almost ten years. It provided all kinds of logistic support to the Sikh terrorists. The purpose was to create an independent Khalistan in place of the Punjab. Several thousand innocent lives in the state, were lost. The Government of India had to go for military intervention, code-named 'Operation Blue-Star', in June 1984, to flush out the terrorists holed-up in the Golden Temple. Although, the operation was successful, but the end-result was quite painful because of the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi-the architect of the 'hostile' geopolitical code. The Khalistan movement, however, weakened over time, and finally disappeared. But, India-Pakistan relationships worsened very much.

Failure to gain success in Khalistan movement, Pakistan now turned to Kashmir again, with a new objective. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had rendered several thousand Afghans homeless, and these homeless Afghans entered Pakistan as refugees. Pakistan settled them in the Occupied-Kashmir, with some ulterior motive. These homeless Afghans had fought the Russians in Afghanistan, and, thus, they had acquired sufficient knowledge of mountain warfare. Moreover, they belonged to the same racial stock, to which the inhabitants of Gilgit (part of Pak-Occupied Kashmir) belonged, i. e. the Poshtu people. With the help of these homeless Poshtu

Afghans, Pakistan formed several militant organizations, with arm-training camps, spread across the Occupied Kashmir, particularly, close to the line of control, with the object of disturbing the rule of law, and creating terror in Jammu & Kashmir. In the 80s, Pakistan made attempts to take over the strategic Siachen Glacier, but the attempts were foiled by the Indian army. Having failed to capture the strategic Siachen Glacier, Pakistan began sustaining terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir with the help of the militant organizations that it formed.

Since 1989 Pakistan started abetting cross-border terrorism to disturb the state of Jammu & Kashmir. Over time the intensity of Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism increased to the extent as to have created a 'war-like' situation, all along the line of control in Jammu & Kashmir. An Israeli-type military action to destroy the militant camps beyond line of control in the Occupied Kashmir was hotly debated in the political circle, but the plan was dropped and abandoned for reasons best known to the ruling elites. Instead, India detonated a series of nuclear explosions to 'terrorize' Pakistan in 1998, but the attempts misfired with Pakistan responding to India's challenge, detonated a series of nuclear explosions. A nuclear arm-race between India and Pakistan, thus, started taking shape over Kashmir that made the 'geopolitics' in the sub-continent highly sensitive and nuclearized. Pakistan described cross-border terrorism as 'freedom struggle,' and re-newed the demand for 'plebiscite' in Jammu & Kashmir. But, this time, Pakistan's demand did not get support from the western world, but China continued to support it. India was required to be tough this time. With the increase in the intensity of cross-border terrorism, the political situation in the state of Jammu & Kashmir became more 'fluid and threatening'. Villages after villages, inhabited by the Muslims, Hindus, and the Sikhs, were targeted by the Pak-trained terrorists which saw brutal killings of innocents people.

Pakistan, as it is said, had vowed to avenge the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 war, by dislodging Jammu & Kashmir from the India Union. It was, perhaps, in the background of a specified political strategy Pakistan used the Afghan refugees to obtain its desired political goal. By settling the Afghan refugees in

the occupied part of Kashmir, Pakistan sought to change the demographic character of the region, so that in future, this region could give more trouble to India geo-strategically. As a part of a 'war-game' Pakistan secretly planned a massive infiltration across the line of control into the Kashmir valley in 1999-2000, with the help of the Afghan refugees, local tribal terrorists, Talibani elements, and so on. The plan of infiltration was to be executed in the summer of 2001, particularly, when the ice starts making it easier to cross the mountains and deep valleys vis-à-vis the line of control. Massive infiltration occurred in the summer of 2001. It was the largest infiltration since 1947. The infiltrators had occupied the bankers that the Indian troops had temporarily vacated. This is the normal practice of the Indian troops to vacate the bankers in the summer months and to re-occupy them with the beginning of the cool months because the pressure from the other side becomes less during these summer months. The Pakistan-supported infiltrators used this opportunity, they not only occupied and infiltrated into Indian territory, but also brought a sophisticated weaponry system and huge ration and food items with the intention of long warfare.

Fierce fighting continued for nearly month between the Indian army, and the infiltrators and the Pakistani army combined. But the fighting was confined along the line of control. The fighting was known as the Kargil war. The Indian army had planned to cross the line of control, but the decision was latter abandoned because, as thought, then, by the strategists that Pakistan might use her nuclear weapons. Although the infiltrators and the elements of the Pakistani army which had occupied the bankers within Indian territory, were driven out. After much persuasion by the US, and the members of G7, Pakistan agreed to respect the line of control. China, however, maintained a 'cautious' neutrality during the Kargil war, in spite of the visit of the Pakistani foreign minister to master Peking's support, but he had to return empty-handed. The change in Chinese attitude might be attributed to: (1) India's growing strength in the region, and (2) apprehension of troubles in Tibet, because the Tibetans had been demanding freedom from the Chinese rule for long, and China feared that a support to Pakistan's Kashmir policy might result in a demand for right to self-determination for the Tibetans via-avis a demand for independence of Tibet.

Pakistan, however, became diplomatically isolated during the Kargil war. But, lose in the Kargil war, made Pakistan to further intensify the cross-border terrorism not only in Jammu & Kashmir, but also elsewhere in India. The attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001 was a part of the cross-border terrorism, and war again seemed inevitable between India and Pakistan. There was every apprehension of escalation of a nuclear war between the two, but somehow the war was averted. India, however, continued to adopt an hostile attitude towards Pakistan, and in a changed world political scenario, following the cessation of the Cold War, the

relevance of a non-aligned geopolitical code disappeared, and, at the same, time a more vigorous foreign policy, not based on the emotion of the Panchshila , became a geopolitical necessity for India. Nevertheless, India tried to improve bi-lateral relations with Pakistan. At the various meetings and summits of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) India had adopted a very positive attitude towards Pakistan, but Pakistan was, rather, reluctant to normalize relation with India. It was only at the Islamabad Summit of the SAARC that a change in Pakistan attitude was noticed. And, since then both the countries started what may be called 'confidence building measures,' but the outcomes are yet to be encouraging. Pakistan's continued support to terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir, and in other parts of India raised doubts over her intention. Therefore, a 'hostile' attitude towards Pakistan is allowed to be carried on till Pakistan openly abandons her hostility against India.

Apart from Pakistan, India faced troubles from her eastern and northern neighbours, because these neighbours prefer to see India, rather, weak, so that it could not dominate the South Asia. India was required to be cautious from Sri-Lanka, although the civil war there in Sri-Lanka, had India's implicit but

tactical support, once, because one of the involved communities in the civil war has paternal linkages with the Indian Tamils, therefore, clandestine support to the fighting Tamils was a socio-cultural paternal necessity for Indian government. But, now situations changed, following the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the Tamil militants. Instead of being hostile to the Sinhalese, and the Sri-Lankan government, the Indian government has expressed serious concern to the militancy of the Tamils. A support to the Tamil militancy in Sri-Lanka will create a 'natural' problem for Indian state of Tamilnadu. Therefore, it is in the interest of India's territorial integrity that India should have a hostile approach towards the Sri-Lankan Tamils, so that these elements could not create problems in the Indian state of Tamilnadu. India needs some kind of 'restraint' hostile approach towards Nepal, because it has become a potential source of 'red' terrorism, may be under the influence of China. Nepal is taking the opportunity of open borders with India, and 'exporting' red elements to India in an organized way, with the object of causing political instability in the frontier and northern peripheral areas of India. Large part of India is now under the influence of the red terror, being sustained by the communists of Nepal. Sino-Nepalese relations have improved to a greater extent that necessarily worries to India. The Nepalese communists are getting supports from their Chinese counterparts to cause troubles in India. Since the Indo-Nepalese boundary is not restricted one, the cross-border movement is very easy. Besides, so many problems have emerged between India and Nepal that require a tough attitude towards Nepal.

It is a hard fact reality that emerging geopolitical scenario in and around India, and the Indian ocean as well, necessarily make India to pursue a tough and 'restraint' hostile geopolitical code, rather than a peaceful Panchshila geopolitical code, towards her neighbours, because of their consistent supports to the insurgent and terrorist groups of the various ethnic and sub-nationalist groups of India, which have waged war against India, using the territories of these neighbours.

Similarly, Australia and the Republic of South Africa also do not prefer to India's policing of the Indian Ocean. India, particularly, since the Kargil war, has entered into strategic deals with a number of countries of Central Asia, and with the Island Countries of the Arabian Sea. This shows a 'paradigm-shift' in India's geopolitical code from Panchshila to one of hegemony and domination, beyond Cohen-stated (1972) South Asian geostrategic region. India is looking towards both the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean, as she is making efforts to ensure her presence in both the oceans, not just for strategic purposes, but also for political, social and economic purposes.

India's main approach is to frustrate any move by her immediate neighbours to form a strategic 'alliance' against her, and for that an aggressive geopolitical code cannot be ruled out, rather, it is the best way to maintain regional balance of power.

The proposed Indo-US nuclear deal is very much a part of a 'paradigm-shift' in India's geopolitical code, given the geopolitical developments, rapidly taking place in Post Cold War world, with China making every possible effort to downsize India's strategic, political, economic, and other interests, not only in Asia-Pacific, and Asia-Indian Ocean realms, but also in South America-Atlantic Ocean-African realm, so that India could not equal China in international geopolitics.


## **REGIONAL OR GLOBAL POWER**

Successful detonations of a series of nuclear explosions and test-fires of inter-continental missiles of wider ranges have made India, one of the emerging global powers to play a decisive role in international geopolitics. India is an emerging economy also, with a relatively higher growth rate. Though, economic growth is not higher than Japan and China, but it is certainly higher to sustain her military prowess vis-à-vis nuclear capabilities for the years to come.



The Soviet Union relegated to a peripheral country after the cessation of the Cold War vis-à-vis the end of confrontation, because its economy was incapable to sustain her military prowess. Pakistan may have acquired nuclear capability, but its economic capacity is not such that it can sustain its nuclear programmes vis-à-vis military prowess for long. It is a falling economy with a stagnant negative growth for the last couple of years, and there is no sign of its improvement in the coming future. It may face the same fate as the Soviets had experienced in the late 90s of the last century.

India emerged as a South Asian regional power in the early 90s, particularly, when her economy started coming out of recession, following the adoption of the economic privatization and liberalization policy, allowing foreign investments, in the economic sector, including in the sector of infrastructure. Towards the end of the 20th. Century, India was recognized as a ‘fast developing’ country by the western political and strategic analysts, and, then, by the USA and its allies. But, China’s reaction in this regard was more ‘guarded’. It was during this time, India made a series of successful detonations of nuclear explosions, besides successes in the field of defense researches, but these ‘successes,’ probably, worried western powers, particularly, the USA, that put ‘sanction’ against India. Several western countries, including other countries holding nuclear capabilities, known for their power potentials also followed the US way. India was asked to sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that India refused to sign it.



Source: The Economist

The refusal to sign the NPT showed India’s firm determination to sustain the pressure of the nuclear power-holding countries. India did not yield, rather, continued with her nuclear programmes. Economic

growth coupled with military 'preparedness' face any eventuality, made India a regional power in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean realm, particularly, towards the end of the twentieth century. China's cautious approach and acquiescence during the Kargil war in 2001 might be attributed to India's growing military prowess, backed by its economic potentials that the Chinese realized. This time they refrained from issuing any ultimatum to India as they had done in the earlier India-Pakistan wars.

With the cessation of the Cold War, the bi-polar world was replaced by multi-polar world, in spite of the 'unchallenged' US economic and military prowess. Number power nodes emerged in the periphery of the world-systems with capacity to challenge not only each other, but also, to powerful States. In the multi-polar world, the non-aligned approach has become redundant; rather, a powerful hegemonic approach appears to be geopolitically more appropriate.

Each pole and / or power node has to survive, and for survival, it has to struggle (social Darwinism). The powerful one survives, and the weaker one is either disintegrated, or absorbed by the powerful one. This is the way the international relations function, and result in the alignment of the political forces. It is an ever-changing geopolitical phenomenon in the world-systems. Since, most of the military and strategic alliances of the Cold War period have either disintegrated or disappeared, except the NATO, whose aerial extent has widened with the incorporation of some former socialist countries of central and Eastern Europe in the recent past. The period of strategic alliance has ended following the emergence of multi-polar world, and each pole is supposed to develop its own military power to resist the pressure and expansion of other country, or group of countries. It is, therefore, imperative for each nation, irrespective of their base of power potentials, to develop its military prowess, based on economic power potentials. India is one of those poles and / or power nodes that have emerged in the recent past, and the future of the world appears to be destined by its 'changed' geopolitical code that aims at becoming 'an entity uniquely dominant in the global system, with a position of pre-eminence, i.e. weltmacht.' India is, therefore, one of those few States in the world that has the necessary military capacity, and economic potentialities, to decide the destiny of the global geopolitics. The traditional core States, including the USA, is getting older with the passage of time, but India and China are the new entrants in the present world-systems. Both are attempting to acquire a dominant position in the global power-politics, with the intention of becoming 'weltmacht.'

## CONCLUSION

India's non-aligned geopolitical system that it sought to spatialize in the field of international relations was destined by the following conditioning factors:

1. its contemporary location on the threshold of the two mutually exclusive power systems, being sustained by the US-maritime power and the Soviet-led continental power;
2. its adherence to the ancient traditions of tolerance, synthesis, peace and assimilation;
3. its comparative material weakness to sustain the pressure from the aforesaid military alliances;
4. its perception that alignment with any of the alliances would make the territory of the country 'a centre of intense geopolitical rivalry', between the opposite forces, trying to bring as much area as possible of the Asiatic Rimland under their zone of influence;
5. its ardent belief that the people who had achieved freedom from the foreign rule, would disapprove any such idea that would again, put them under the 'shadow' influence of foreign hegemony and domination;

6. its fear of being dominated by either of the alliances, if it entered into any kind of strategic deals with any of the alliances, in that case, its internal and external relations would have been subject to guidance by any one of them, with whom it had a defense pact.;
7. Its assumption that alignment with any of the blocs / alliances, would result in the re-emergence of historical centrifugal forces, and it would have been difficult to hold together the country.

The preference to a non-aligned geopolitical code was a geopolitical necessity for a new State like India, which was undergoing a formative phase of its integration, consolidation and federation, at the time when 'containment, deterrence, counter-deterrence, resistance, and armageddon scenario etc,' became the preferred words in international politics, particularly, in the bipolar Cold War politics. But, these words had no relevance in India's nonaligned approach, because the approach was based on the five principles of peace, called the Panchshila. However, India's non-aligned geopolitical code was not much successful at the regional level, but at the local level, it was a success, because relations with the Himalayan kingdoms were cordials. India offered to continue the British-founded system of informal protectorate over Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, but with assurance of non-intervention in their internal matters, and respect to their territorial integrity. Sikkim latter merged with the Indian Union. Similarly, India had offered an informal paternal attitude to Sri-Lanka (Ceylon). But, this was a period when the politics of Sri-Lanka (Ceylon) was not as disturbed to the extent as to have led to the outbreak of the civil war in the latter years.

However, at the regional level, there was acute rivalry with Pakistan in South Asia and with China at a larger Asian continental scale. Rivalries with Pakistan and China had resulted in a series wars. But, at the global level, the non-aligned geopolitical code was a neither a failure nor a success, rather, it lay at the crossroads or at the median of both-failure and success. One thing, however, requires to be mentioned that on account of this approach, India could save herself from being a 'centre of big-power geopolitical rivalry.'

A change in the geopolitical code started taking place, following the Indo-Soviet Strategic Treaty in September 1971 that necessarily helped India to overcome the problems arising out of 'sustained but implicit' threats from the USA, and China. India won the war against Pakistan, ignoring the Chinese threats, and the threat, posed by the US warship: Enterprise, that entered the Bay of Bengal to help the fighting Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, but the warship simply returned back.

A paradigm-shift in India's geopolitical code was noticed following the successful detonation of a nuclear explosion, and that marked a departure from the Nehruvian legacy of Panchshila, to one of 'sustained hegemony and domination,' in South Asia. The change was necessitated because of changing attitudes and behaviours of the neighbours which started providing necessary sustenance to the different insurgent groups waging war against the Indian State. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar allowed their territories to be used by the insurgent groups of Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, and Tripura. China and Pakistan encouraged infiltrations into Indian territories. Sri-Lankan Tamils attempted to make part of Indian state, Tamil Nadu and, as their military base against Sri-Lanka. On being refused, they started creating problem to the integrity of the Union, and on being surrounded by these geopolitical problems, sustained by the neighbours, India was compelled to adopt a 'restrained' hostile geopolitical code. Of course, India's growing economy was a great help for this change in the geopolitical code.

Since the beginning of the Khalistan movement in the state of Punjab in the early 80s of the last century, and the problem of terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir since the late 80s of the last century, necessarily compelled India to adopt a harder line towards Pakistan, because Pakistan was directly involved in

troubles in the Punjab and in Jammu & Kashmir state of the Union of India. In the east, the ambiguous role of the neighbours, sustaining, helping and provoking the insurgent groups which have waged war against India, further made her to adopt a harder line against them. A 'restraint' hostile geopolitical code, particularly, towards her neighbours became a geopolitical necessity for India to survive. Though Pakistan failed in the Punjab because the Khalistan movement weakened, and finally fizzled out, but it claimed thousands of lives. But, the Pakistan-sponsored movement in Jammu & Kashmir became more dangerous, because it turned into cross-border terrorism of wider spatial dimension. The detonation of nuclear explosions in 1998 was designed to terrorize Pakistan. Indian economy by the time reached a stage that it could sustain the pressure of war preparation, particularly, the preparation of nuclear weaponry system. India got access to what may be called the 'satellite geopolitics', because of successful test-firing of long distance missiles. Economic strength, coupled with military strength, towards the end of the last century, made India a regional power. The cessation of the Cold War in the late 80s and in the early 90s necessarily made the non-aligned approach redundant. Its geopolitical acceptability disappeared with the multi-polarization of the global political pattern. India, emerging fast as a regional power, became one of the poles of the 'new' world, with the capacity to motivate not only the regional politics, but also the global politics. Panchshila to India, thus, became meaningless, given the pressures it had to sustain.

India is now an acknowledged power, aspiring to become a 'weltmacht.' Its economy has shown a phenomenal increase, with a higher growth rate, comparable to the growth rate of China, another Asian country, trying hard to become a 'weltmacht'. Both India and China are in stiff competition to become super-power in the coming years, or decades. As the world witnessed US-USSR rivalry during the Cold War period, the post-modern world would witness Sino-Indian rivalry. It has already been suggested to include India in the G8 in place of Russia as a member, not as an observer. India may be the second, or the third Asian country to become a 'core' power, in the world-economy.

## REFERENCES

- Brecher, M. (1959) Nehru: A Political Biography. London. Oxford University Press. P 563.
- Bunge, W. (1982) the Nuclear War Atlas. Society for Human Exploration. Quebec. Victoria Ville.
- Cohen, S. (1973) Geography and Politics in a World Divided. 2nd. Edition. New York. Oxford University Press.
- Galtung, J. (1979) the True World. New York. Free Press.
- Grygiel J J (2006) Great Power and geopolitical change Johns Hopking University Press, Baltimore MD
- Henrikson, A. K. (1980) "The Geographical Mental Maps of American Foreign Policy", International Political Science Review. 1: pp. 495-530.
- Kaplan R D (2009) The revenge of geography Foreign Policy May-June 96-105
- Kearns G (2009) a Geopolitics and empire: the legacy of Halford Mackinder Oxford University Press Oxford`
- Mackinder H J 1911 The teaching of Geography from an imperial point of view, and the use which could and should be made of visual instruction Geographical Teacher **6** 79–86
- Maddrell A 2010 Academic geography as terra incognita: lessons from the 'expedition debate' and another border to cross Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers
- Markham C 1898 The field of Geography Geographical Journal **11** 1–15
- Palmer, N. D. (1961) the Indian Political System. London. Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Rosenthal, A. M.( 1956) "India Sees Her Role as Power for Peace", New York Times. Sept.24.
- Reid-Henry S 2009 The age of explorations is over Guardian 15 May

- Spykman, N. J. (1944) *The Geography of the Peace*. New York. Hartcourt, Brace.
- Taylor, P. G. & Flint, C. (2000) *Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State, Locality*. 4th. Edition (First Indian Reprint 2004). New Delhi. Pearson Education (Singapore). Pvt. Ltd.
- Thomson H 2009 There's a whole wide world out there still waiting to be explored Times 20 May
- Woodman, D (1969) *Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian and Russian Rivalries*. London. The Cresset Press.

Dr. N.L. Dongre

C-14 Jaypee Nagar Rewa 486450

Email Address: dongrenl@gmail.com, nl.dongre@jalindia.co.in